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C R I T I Q U E  A N D  C O M M E N T 
THE PL ACE OF THE FIRST PEOPLES 
IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE: 
A LO GICAL STARTING POINT FOR THE DEMAND 
FOR JUSTICE BY INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
M A R K  M CMI L L A N *  A N D  SO P H I E  RI G N E Y †  
The place of Indigenous peoples at the intersection of domestic and international arenas 
has shifted. While international law was traditionally used by states to oppress 
Indigenous peoples, today it can be used by Indigenous peoples to hold states to account 
and to assert specific demands for continued participation in law and politics at a 
domestic and international level. This shift is evidenced by the transformation of the 
concept of indigeneity. This was originally a term imposed upon Indigenous peoples by 
colonial powers, and was used to bind various groups of Indigenous peoples and to 
account for state action in relation to them. However, in recent years Indigenous peoples 
have had a significant stake in creating and clarifying the imposed concept and its 
contemporary use and meaning. This has transformed indigeneity from a tool of 
oppression to a tool of potentially greater freedom. For those Indigenous peoples searching 
for and demanding justice, this suggests a necessary starting point at the intersection of 
the domestic and the international. 
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I   I N T R O D U C T IO N 
This article examines the concept of indigeneity, as placed at the intersection 
between the domestic and the international.1 The concept of indigeneity has 
been created at the international level in order to bind various groups of 
Indigenous peoples, and to account for state action in relation to them; and 
the international has failed to protect Indigenous peoples and nations 
from the harms done in the process of colonial expansion and territorial 
control between the nations that made up the ‘international order’. Originally, 
the concept of indigeneity emerged at the international level as a tool to justify 
colonial expansion and events occurring within domestic borders. However, 
in recent years, and particularly with the passage of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (‘Declaration’),2 the concept of 
indigeneity has gained power and prominence at the international level, as a 
tool for Indigenous peoples to hold domestic behaviour to account, and 
as a place for the ongoing recognition, practice and maintenance of the 
Indigenous international.3 Importantly for us as international law scholars 
and participants, the international is another space in which Indigenous 
jurisdictions can be evidenced; through actions of other international actors 
(Indigenous and nation-states) and through many other formal and informal 
mechanisms. The issue that confronts international legal scholars now is 
to look at the evidence that already exists and to reimagine that evidence, 
and its use. 
The evidence of Indigenous jurisdictions is as old as the international itself. 
Indigenous nations’ participation in the international is also not something 
new. It did not begin with, nor does it reside only within, the international 
 
 1 By ‘the domestic’ and ‘the international’, we mean the orders of both law and politics, which 
exist at the level of the nation-state and of the international. ‘The domestic’ is related to the 
nation-state. ‘The international’ is related to the interactions between nation-states and to 
organisations such as the United Nations, and includes international law. 
 2 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN GAOR, 
61st sess, 107th plen mtg, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007). 
 3 See Ravi de Costa, A Higher Authority: Indigenous Transnationalism and Australia (UNSW 
Press, 2006) 6–8; Mark McMillan, ‘Koowarta and the Rival Indigenous International: Our 
Place as Indigenous Peoples in the International’ (2014) 23 Griffith Law Review 110, 111–12. 
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human rights frameworks since the Second World War; nor with decolonisa-
tion as a discrete activity of the international order. For us, the international 
is about the continuing coexistence of jurisdictions of territory with its 
etymology based on territorial acquisition and control. In other words, the 
international created the Indigenous for the stability of the international 
order. The Indigenous international exists because the international exists. For 
as long as nation-states have existed — and, by corollary, the domestic has 
existed — Indigenous jurisdictions and nations were inscribed as a necessary 
basis for understanding the international and the domestic. Indigenous 
nations jurisdictions were pre-existing (and continuing) at that moment of 
the emergence of the ‘Indigenous’, ‘savage’, ‘native’, ‘barbarian’ and ‘heathen’, 
and yet the concept of indigeneity was created for the justification of seeking 
of new territories and to make sense of western civilisation.4 Indigeneity and 
reference to the Indigenous nations and jurisdictions was made central to 
the international order, and therefore the domestic. Indigenous peoples and 
nations are able to have a sense of self and place that has always been (since 
time immemorial), and has been adapted to meet the needs of the now and 
the future. 
While originally a mechanism to justify atrocities committed against 
Indigenous peoples, indigeneity is now a way to unite and empower Indige-
nous peoples, and to measure state actions in relation to Indigenous peoples 
against a normative instrument. And while originally a term imposed upon 
Indigenous peoples by colonial powers, indigeneity is now a concept that 
Indigenous peoples have had a significant stake in creating and clarifying. 
Thus, what was once a tool of oppression has become a possibility for justice 
(as demanded and defined by Indigenous peoples and nations) and greater 
action, and this movement has occurred in the space between the domestic 
and the international. 
The shift is profound because the modern international agenda seeks to 
atone for the consequences of the colonial modes of acquisition by focusing 
on the very thing that was created to justify the taking of territory — indige-
neity. This article examines possibilities for Indigenous peoples in achieving 
justice at the transitional intersection of the Indigenous and the modern 
international. We commence with an examination of the lack of an agreed 
 
 4 See generally Robert A Williams Jr, Savage Anxieties: The Invention of Western Civilization 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
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formal definition of indigeneity. We argue that this allows indigeneity an 
important degree of flexibility, and that this supports its ability to be political-
ly active. We then examine the concept of indigeneity in historical context, 
and show the ways in which international law was used to promote the 
interests of the colonial powers, and protect their treatment of Indigenous 
peoples from scrutiny. We then move to consider the role of the modern 
international in the concept of indigeneity, particularly with regards to the 
drafting and passage of the Declaration. We conclude by examining the 
potential of the concept of indigeneity to be used as a tool for greater justice in 
the modern international agenda. 
II   O U R  P L AC E  A S  LAW Y E R S  B E T W E E N  T H E  DO M E S T I C 
A N D  T H E  I N T E R NAT I O NA L  
This article can properly be understood as a conversation. As authors, we 
come to this article from different backgrounds, and seek to bring different 
approaches to the question of indigeneity in the space between the domestic 
and the international. We do this from the positions of Indigenous and non-
Indigenous. This conversation, an act of storytelling, is in furtherance of 
exerting and practising our distinct jurisprudences — to each other, the 
international, the domestic and the Indigenous international. The internation-
al order is a source of law and has its own jurisprudence and jurisdiction. 
Additionally, international law is exercised in a myriad of ways. It has been 
stated previously5 with respect to the complicated way that meeting places of 
law (through conversation in particular) must be operated between individual 
people as actors of our particular jurisprudences. One particular meeting 
place for the exchange of jurisprudence and the exercising of multiple 
jurisdictions is through conversations of scholars. What we mean as authors 
of this concept of meeting places and jurisdictions has been previously stated 
by Mark McMillan: 
Jurisdiction is an outward expression of the internal structure of a particular 
existence. In order to understand a jurisdictional boundary or meeting point 
there must be a recognition of the structured existences of the other to observe 
(and respect) its jurisdiction. More importantly Dorsett and McVeigh assert 
that jurisdiction or ‘speaking the law’ is an activity that must be practised to be 
 
 5 See generally de Costa, above n 3. 
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maintained. Jurisdictional thinking may allow for a better explanation for how 
our lives, our existences (through our laws) are structured.6 
McMillan also wrote: 
The activity of practising jurisprudence through storytelling is neither new nor 
novel. Christine Black and John [Borrows] are Indigenous legal scholars and 
practitioners in both Indigenous and Western systems of law. They emphasise 
that this practice is not new or novel to them; rather, that practice through sto-
rytelling is as old as our societies themselves.7 
Mark: As a Wiradjuri man growing up ‘on country’8 in the west of New 
South Wales with a particular knowledge of the Wiradjuri (Indigenous), the 
international, and the domestic, storytelling and engaging with other scholars 
(like Sophie) is the meeting point that Christine Black and John Borrows refer 
to.9 I conceive of the Wiradjuri jurisdiction and jurisprudence as that of an 
atom. My nucleus is my Wiradjuri jurisdiction and jurisprudence — they hold 
the atom together. It is my ontology and my ontological connection to my 
country. The domestic and international jurisdictions are the electrons that 
orbit the nucleus. All three are needed to make up the atom — but there is a 
nucleus as the core. My Wiradjuri knowing is my core. Conversation with 
Sophie allows the exploration of the limits of experiences and understanding 
of the Indigenous, international and domestic. 
 
 6 McMillan, above n 3, 118 (citations omitted). 
 7 Ibid 112 (citations omitted). Dr Christine Black is a Kombumerri and Munaljahlai woman: 
Griffith University, Dr Christine Black <https://www.griffith.edu.au/engineering-information-
technology/griffith-centre-coastal-management/staff/christine-black>; Professor John Bor-
rows is Anishinabe (also called Ojibway or Chippewa). He is a member of the Chippewa of 
the Nawash First Nation from Georgian Bay, in the Lake Huron area of Ontario, Canada: The 
University of Victoria, John Borrows <http://www.uvic.ca/law/facultystaff/facultydirectory/ 
borrows.php>. 
 8 ‘Country’ for the context used in this article means ‘[a] term used by Aboriginal people to 
refer to the land to which they belong and their place of Dreaming. Aboriginal language 
usage of the word country is much broader than standard English’: Australian Museum, 
Glossary of Indigenous Australia Terms <http://australianmuseum.net.au/glossary-indigen 
ous-australia-terms>. Country is much more than the land; it is also the place of our jurisdic-
tion and jurisprudence. There has always been governance existing of the land with the 
peoples that are connected to it. European conceptions of governance exist in tandem with 
the Indigenous nations that exist over the same territory. 
 9 McMillan, above n 3, 112. 
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Sophie: Growing up as the grandchild of Polish people displaced by war, I 
was attracted to the hope of the international from an early age. I saw interna-
tional law as being able to offer redress for wrongs. This view has been 
nuanced through time working as a defence lawyer at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Having worked closely with 
Kosovars in the newly independent Kosovo, I have seen the potential of 
international law to support the claims of peoples to self-determination. My 
current research is positioned in the field of critical approaches to interna-
tional criminal law, and my continued belief in the possibilities of interna-
tional law is now present in my view that international law must transform 
into a stronger system than it is presently. In the current conversation, I am 
grounded in my appreciation of how international law might operate as a tool 
for peoples to use to pursue claims to justice. 
In this article, we are engaged in a dialogue that rests upon different ap-
proaches to, and experiences of, international law. We are able to interrogate 
the hope of international law from different perspectives, in order to deter-
mine whether and how it can be of assistance to Indigenous peoples. This 
conversation necessitates a note on terminology: we use the collective (‘us’, 
‘our’, ‘we’) to describe arguments or ideas we share in this conversation — a 
meeting point between our Indigenous and non-Indigenous ways of knowing. 
We use plural and alternative terms (‘us or them’, ‘our or their’, ‘ourselves or 
themselves’) to demonstrate a space of belonging to which non-Indigenous 
people do not have full access. As a non-Indigenous scholar, Sophie does not 
seek to claim the same space as Mark inhabits — indeed, this is why the 
current conversation is occurring, in order to better understand our respec-
tive ways of knowing. Words like ‘ourselves’ indicate Mark’s indigeneity and 
belonging to Indigenous communities. Its attendant ‘themselves’ indicates that 
Sophie does not hold the same belonging. 
A  Defining Indigeneity 
There is no one agreed definition of indigeneity.10 A study undertaken by the 
United Nations Special Rapporteur José Martínez Cobo (‘Cobo Study’), to 
 
 10 Megan Davis, ‘Indigenous Struggles in Standard-Setting: The United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2008) 9 Melbourne Journal of International Law 439, 443; 
Hurst Hannum, ‘New Developments in Indigenous Rights’ (1988) 28 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 649, 662. 
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examine discrimination against Indigenous peoples, provided a working 
definition of Indigenous peoples: 
those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial 
societies … [who] consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the socie-
ties now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present 
non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and 
transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic iden-
tity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with 
their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.11 
This definition is the most frequently cited, but is not an official definition.12 
For some states, the Cobo Study definition is unacceptable.13 For some 
Indigenous peoples too, a formal definition is problematic: Indigenous 
peoples have routinely asserted the right to define ourselves or themselves.14 
Nonetheless, the lack of an official or agreed definition is not necessarily 
problematic for the concept of indigeneity. Benedict Kingsbury argues that 
the international concept of Indigenous peoples can be understood in either 
positivist or constructivist terms,15 and we adopt his view that the constructiv-
ist approach ‘better captures its functions and significance in global interna-
tional institutions and normative instruments’.16 The constructivist approach 
deals with the concept of Indigenous peoples as not something that is clearly 
defined by agreed criteria, but rather 
as embodying a continuous process in which claims and practices in numerous 
specific cases are abstracted in the wider institutions of international society, 
 
 11 José R Martínez Cobo, Special Rapporteur, Study of the Problem of Discrimination against 
Indigenous Populations — Volume V: Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 and Add.4 (March 1987) 29 [379]. 
 12 Davis, ‘Indigenous Struggles in Standard-Setting’, above n 10, 442–3. 
 13 Ibid. 
 14 Robert A Williams Jr, ‘Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: 
Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples’ Survival in the World’ [1990] Duke Law Journal 
660, 663–4 n 4. See also Hannum, above n 10, 665. 
 15 Benedict Kingsbury, ‘“Indigenous Peoples” in International Law: A Constructivist Approach 
to the Asian Controversy’ (1998) 92 American Journal of International Law 414, 414–15. 
 16 Ibid 415. 
988 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 39:981 
 
then made specific again at the moment of application in the political, legal and 
social processes of particular cases and societies.17 
This approach shows the place of the concept of indigeneity at the intersection 
of the domestic and international: it moves between these spheres, allowing 
the domestic (and local) application of the international. This fluidity is 
important, because ‘many specific problems as to the meaning of “indigenous 
peoples” and related concepts can be solved only in accordance with processes 
and criteria that vary among different societies and institutions’.18 While 
much binds various groups of Indigenous peoples, there is also much varia-
tion between the communities. This is true not only between nation-states, 
but in some cases, within them: Australia, for example, has hundreds of 
Aboriginal nations. A constructivist approach to the concept of indigeneity 
allows not only recognition, but also celebration, of the complexity of Indige-
nous peoples and our or their heritages, experiences, and cultures. 
Some may argue that this approach is overly politicised, fluid, and prob-
lematic — even indeterminate. For example, Jeremy Waldron argues that 
these ‘definitional uncertainties reflect an instructive ambivalence as to the 
basis of indigeneity’s importance’.19 Waldron suggests that definitions of 
indigeneity rest on either the principle of first occupancy (which focuses on 
indigeneity as linked to peoples being the first to occupy the land), or the 
principle of prior occupancy (which focuses on the idea of indigeneity as 
relative to colonial powers).20 To Waldron, both are flawed, and both have 
consequences for exclusionary proprietary interests.21 Focusing particularly 
on the principle of first occupancy, Waldron suggests that a concept of 
indigeneity that rests upon the question of ‘[w]ho was here first’ poses 
‘difficulty and danger’.22 Waldron is particularly concerned with the motiva-
tions behind definitions and claims of indigeneity: 
Indigeneity calls for a more radical approach — not just remedial measures 
to address maldistribution, but a restoration to the descendants of indige-
 
 17 Ibid. 
 18 Ibid. 
 19 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Indigeneity? First Peoples and Last Occupancy’ (2003) 1 New Zealand 
Journal of Public and International Law 55, 65. 
 20 Ibid 55–6. 
 21 Ibid 56. 
 22 Ibid 82. 
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nous peoples of some or all of the rights — rights of sovereignty, rights of prop-
erty — that were once held by their ancestors.23  
It is therefore not only the lack of definitional clarity that concerns Waldron, 
but what might flow from this, particularly in terms of land distribution and 
rights. As Kingsbury points out, there has been significant disagreement 
over the justifications inherent in the concept of ‘indigenous peoples’ as cur-
rently understood. Controversy arises in particular from the implication that 
distinctive rights of indigenous peoples are justified by the destruction of their 
previous territorial entitlements and political autonomy wrought by historic 
circumstances of invasion and colonization.24 
Such concerns link the perceived lack of clarity around indigeneity to the 
existence of specialised Indigenous rights. Kirsty Gover demonstrates that 
these rights are particularly vulnerable, as they  
appear to derive from a particular set of historic circumstances or experiences, 
or else from political bargains, and so fall outside of the corpus of universal 
human rights that vest in all human beings by virtue of their humanity.25  
And because there is no real consensus around why such rights are needed, 
and whether they are political rights rather than inherent human rights, 
‘questions arise as to their political purpose and function, requiring justifica-
tions of the kind that are seldom sought of individual civil and political 
rights’.26 Waldron can perhaps be seen as a typical example of these concerns. 
While Kingsbury suggests that the most appropriate way of addressing this is 
to interpret the concept flexibly so that it can accommodate a range of 
justifications,27 Waldron’s concerns about what he sees as the indeterminacy of 
indigeneity are unlikely to be assuaged by this approach. 
We are not as concerned as Waldron by any indeterminacy of the concept 
of indigeneity. Indigeneity is, for us, not something that must be ‘determined’ 
in the way that Waldron calls for. As we have noted above, Indigenous peoples 
 
 23 Ibid 61 (emphasis in original). 
 24 Kingsbury, above n 15, 419. 
 25 Kirsty Gover, Review Essay: The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, 
Strategy by Karen Engle (2011) 12 Melbourne Journal of International Law 419, 425. 
 26 Ibid. 
 27 Kingsbury, above n 15, 419. 
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themselves may reject formal definitions. Another aspect that needs to be 
raised in the conversation is: so what? This issue of how non-Indigenous 
scholars seek to place Indigenous peoples in the international is seemingly 
limited, as the discourse is confined to issues of what indigeneity means for 
people and its requirement for such definitions to be fixed. This fixity seems to 
be desired so that scholars can make sense of the international order for 
where Indigenous peoples might fit, or the international as a particular space 
where Indigenous peoples may have a voice — but the place of that voice 
within the international order, and the conditions in which the space operates, 
are dictated. There is a whole other dimension as to that assertion of the 
creation of space and dictating the terms of its operations — that is, what do 
we say the space is as Indigenous peoples? What are the conditions in which 
we participate in the space? We or they dictate those terms and the conditions 
on which those terms evolve and adapt. 
As international legal scholars, we understand the importance of the work 
of Kingsbury and Waldron. However, we seek to explore why it is that non-
Indigenous people strive to allow Indigenous peoples to be. We also want 
to explore the conditions in which Indigenous peoples assert who and what 
we or they are. This is the place of the Indigenous in the international: it is up 
to Indigenous people to decide — and not for non-Indigenous people to 
place, define and confine within a definitional sense. Although it may be 
comforting to western scholars and institutions to assert a definition for 
indigeneity, it is important to recognise that Indigenous peoples do not exist 
for the comfort of others. It is the considerations of Indigenous peoples that 
should be paramount in any discussions on the need or otherwise for a 
definition of indigeneity. 
It should be the job of non-Indigenous scholars to interrogate the interna-
tional, so that the international Indigenous can make sense for them. Interna-
tional legal scholars should establish better meeting points of jurisdictions, in 
order to better understand the lawful relationships of jurisdictions that are in 
fact defined. Indigenous peoples know who we or they are. This is how we 
or they know the worlds that we or they inhabit and share. It has been this 
way — always. Not just commencing at the point of the international. What is 
not fixed, that Kingsbury takes comfort in, is that way in which the interna-
tional order adapts its own processes and etymologies because it now knows 
things about the Indigenous international that have always been. The meeting 
place is changing — but not from an Indigenous point of reference. The 
international is changing because it is required to adapt as a result of new 
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knowledge about the Indigenous international: not that it [the international] 
created the Indigenous international, but that it is now allowed to witness the 
Indigenous international in different ways. 
Moreover, we argue that this lack of fixedness is useful for indigeneity as a 
tool to be used for justice for Indigenous peoples. Kingsbury’s point is that a 
constructivist approach to indigeneity allows the concept to be deployed at 
multiple levels for a variety of purposes, and to us this demonstrates the 
capacity of the concept of indigeneity to act as a political tool for justice for 
Indigenous peoples. Acting as a tool for justice is particularly important when 
we consider how, historically, the concept of indigeneity has been used as 
a tool for oppression and to justify the actions of colonial powers against 
Indigenous peoples. This overt acceptance of the political uses of indigeneity 
may be confronting for some, as shown in the above discussion of Waldron’s 
concerns, and the purported use of indigeneity to ‘justify’ rights. In accepting 
the political use of the concept of indigeneity, we perhaps leave it vulnerable 
to attack from those who are concerned by what a concept might be politically 
employed to achieve. However, any such fear is perhaps indicative of the very 
need to employ indigeneity as a tool for greater justice and rights. We 
acknowledge that Indigenous communities are political actors, capable of 
pursuing various actions to realise particular goals. Indigenous communities 
are not only beneficiaries of rights, but are able to invoke tools in order 
to realise justice. The concept of indigeneity, we argue, is one such tool. It is 
therefore important to examine how indigeneity has been used historically 
to oppress Indigenous peoples, before analysing its use in the modern 
international agenda. 
B  Defining Justice 
When considering the justice claims of Indigenous peoples, it is important to 
consider the importance of governance. Indigenous rights are not simply 
human rights or minority rights, but necessarily involve a claim of governance 
and self-determination. As Robert A Williams Jr notes, the rights that matter 
most to Indigenous peoples are collective rights, land rights, self-
determination, and international legal status.28 These rights are core to the 
conception of justice, and acknowledge the importance of jurisdiction. The 
 
 28 Williams, ‘Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law’, above n 14, 685–99. 
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recognition of the Indigenous in the international is similarly integral to this 
conception of justice. 
In defining justice, an understanding of injustice might also assist. Injus-
tice has included dispossession (from land, from culture, from country), 
imposition (of illness, of jurisdiction) and disrespect (of sovereignty, of power, 
of ways of knowing). These injustices were facilitated by — indeed, could not 
have happened without — the creation of the concept of indigeneity which 
provided for territorial acquisition. Justice, then, will be realised in part 
through advancement of nation-building, acknowledgment of sovereignty and 
self-determination. Integral to all these is indigeneity: it is impossible to 
imagine a nation, sovereignty, or self-determination in the absence of indige-
neity. For Indigenous peoples, justice cannot be achieved without our or their 
being Indigenous. Indigeneity is crucial to justice, as it was to injustice. 
Without the creation of indigeneity for the purposes of the territorial acquisi-
tion which grounded and foregrounded the injustices perpetrated against 
Indigenous peoples, there would not be the need for justice to be done. 
C  Defining the International 
It is important to recognise the different variations of the transnational and 
international. As noted above, even within nation-states, there may be a 
number of Indigenous nations. Our or their interactions are rightly conceived 
of as transnational. By Indigenous transnationalism, we mean the interactions 
and relationships between Indigenous peoples or nations. This is a form of 
internationalism: it is the recognition by Indigenous sovereigns and jurisdic-
tions, of other Indigenous sovereigns and jurisdictions. This ensures that 
Indigenous internationalism is not bounded by either the domestic or the 
international as traditionally conceptualised, but rather, it is a form of 
transnational interaction between nations that exist separately from the 
nation-state. Indeed, Indigenous transnationalism is most appropriately seen 
as the activities of Indigenous peoples outside the traditional nation-state.29 In 
other words, Indigenous transnationalism is the activities that occur in the 
space between the domestic and the international. 
Indigenous transnationalism is not a recent phenomenon. Ravi de Costa 
notes that there is a long history of Indigenous peoples going beyond the 
 
 29 de Costa, above n 3, 2–3. 
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nation-state in order to advance their position and pursue justice.30 While 
Indigenous transnationalism is not new, the discourse around it has gained 
prominence in recent times.31 Indigenous nations have — despite the efforts 
of colonisation — continued to recognise the sovereignty of other Indigenous 
nations, and the interactions between Indigenous nations have been premised 
on the sovereignty, jurisdictions and governance of those nations. Such 
interactions are evidenced in, for example, the songlines of Aboriginal 
Australia. As McMillan points out, to sustain such relationships, ‘there was, 
and still remains, a very strong sense of the international’.32 While colonising 
powers may not have witnessed these relationships, they have nonetheless 
continued to thrive.33 The concept of the international is, therefore, familiar to 
Indigenous peoples, who have navigated relationships for millennia. As 
McMillan argues, in Australia this permits a collective jurisdiction of Indige-
nous nations, allowing a creation and maintenance of jurisprudence.34 
When we consider Indigenous transnationalism, it is clear that there are 
borders within borders; internal borders are present within nation-states. The 
transnational allows work to occur at these different levels of international-
ism. The international arena, in McMillan’s words, ‘provides a place where the 
Indigenous jurisdictions are not dependent on the jurisdiction of the nation 
state to exist’.35 It is this which provides much possibility for the advancement 
of Indigenous rights in the international realm. 
 
 30 Ibid 5. 
 31 McMillan, above n 3, 123–4. See also ibid 4. 
 32 McMillan, above n 3, 123. 
 33 See generally Mark McMillan and Martin Clark, ‘Making Sense of Indigeneity, Aboriginality 
and Identity: Race as a Constitutional Conundrum since 1983’ (2015) 24 Griffith Law 
Review 106. 
 34 McMillan, above n 3, 123. 
 35 Ibid 118. 
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III   I N D I G E N E I T Y  A S  A  T O O L  O F  J U S T I F I C AT I O N 
F O R  CO L O N IA L  EX PA N SIO N  
With colonial expansion, the arrival of settler societies created an Indigenous 
descriptor to be applied to people who already inhabited that land.36 The term 
Indigenous set apart those who lived in the land from those who sought the 
land. Thus, the concept of indigeneity was necessarily created from colonial 
expansion: before colonialism’s need to ‘other’ the original inhabitants of the 
land, there had been no requirement to define or label those who would 
become Indigenous.37 From this beginning, the concept of indigeneity was 
used in various ways during the period of colonial expansion. While the 
transnational has existed for Indigenous peoples for a long time, it is the 
international that has created the concept of indigeneity, for the purposes of 
the international and its expansion. 
Anaya has set out the historical context of international legal thought con-
cerning Indigenous peoples.38 Throughout, we can see the ways in which 
Indigenous peoples were defined, in ways that would both permit and justify 
colonial behaviour. Anaya separates his historical account into four periods. 
First, the ‘early naturalist’ period is typified by Francisco de Vitoria and his 
articulation of ‘the grounds on which Europeans could be said validly to 
acquire Indian lands or assert authority over them’.39 While de Vitoria was of 
the view that American Indians were rational human beings,40 he also 
articulated another view which would permit Spanish administration over 
Indian lands for the benefit of the Indians. This view preceded the trusteeship 
doctrine used by 19th century colonial powers to justify their actions.41 
The ‘early modern state system and the law of nations’ period saw the de-
velopment of the concept of sovereignty as applicable to nation-states rather 
 
 36 S James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 
2000) 3. See also Paul Keal, European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The 
Moral Backwardness of International Society (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 8. 
 37 See also Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel, ‘Being Indigenous: Resurgences against 
Contemporary Colonialism’ (2005) 40 Government and Opposition 597. 
 38 Anaya, above n 36. 
 39 Ibid 10. For more on de Vitoria, see generally Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and 
the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 13–31. 
 40 Anaya, above n 36, 11. 
 41 See ibid 11–12. 
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than to groups.42 In Anaya’s third historical period, the ‘positivists’ interna-
tional law’ period of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, positivists ensured 
that international law ‘would become a legitimizing force for colonization and 
empire rather than a liberating one for indigenous peoples’.43 The primacy of 
states and their sovereignty ensured that Indigenous peoples were excluded 
from participating in the development of international law, and could not use 
international law to affirm their rights (once seen as inherent, by virtue of 
natural law).44 As a result, states were able to use international law both to 
maintain their claims to Indigenous territories, and to treat Indigenous 
peoples in accordance with domestic policies, protected from international 
scrutiny or accountability by virtue of the concept of sovereignty.45 Interna-
tional law was both a shield and a sword for colonising powers in their claims 
to Indigenous lands, and their interactions with Indigenous peoples: interna-
tional law was able to both justify the claims of colonial states and to protect 
them from any outside interference. As time progressed, colonial powers 
frequently invoked notions of trusteeship to justify actions towards Indige-
nous peoples.46 This was grounded in ‘scientific racism’, and had the objective 
of ‘civilising’ Indigenous peoples.47 Indigeneity was formulated through the 
alleged superiority of the colonisers on physical, political, racial and religious 
grounds. This justificatory taxonomy, and its application to ‘civilise’ Indige-
nous peoples and attempt to dispossess us or them of culture and heritage, 
created a further injustice that exacerbated the appropriation of the ‘old lands’ 
of Indigenous peoples. 
Similarly, Williams has outlined historical approaches to Indigenous rights 
under the ‘doctrine of discovery’.48 As he sets out, western scholars of 
international law interpreted the doctrine of discovery and its widespread use 
 
 42 Ibid 13–14. 
 43 Ibid 19. 
 44 Ibid. 
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 46 Ibid 23–4. 
 47 Ibid 24. See generally Anghie, above n 39. 
 48 Williams, ‘Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law’, above n 14, 
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in settler states as evidence of customary laws of dealing with Indigenous 
peoples, and they concluded that indigenously-occupied lands could be 
considered terra nullius.49 Williams argues that ‘[t]hrough the preachings of 
these Western theorists, indigenous peoples were effectively dismissed as 
subjects of concern in international legal discourse’.50 Indigenous peoples 
were ‘simply “not a legal unit of international law”’.51 
Throughout these different historical periods, then, Indigenous peoples 
were recognised — but in ways that would justify colonial claims to territory. 
Indigenous peoples were unable to enjoy sovereign status or rights in interna-
tional law, and international law was ‘able to govern the patterns of coloniza-
tion and ultimately to legitimate the colonial order’.52 Indigeneity was not 
only accepted but in fact promoted as a way to solidify the claims of the 
colonialists. International law used indigeneity to protect domestic action of 
settler states. In the space between the domestic and the international, 
indigeneity was used against Indigenous peoples. 
Are there implications of this historical background for how Indigenous 
peoples conceive of, and pursue, justice? Karen Engle argues that the different 
ways in which colonial expansion occurred has led to differences in goals and 
advocacy in Indigenous communities.53 Areas that were colonised by British 
and French forces, relying on the use of treaties or by invoking the doctrine of 
terra nullius to acquire the land, have subsequently pursued self-
determination claims as being of primary importance.54 Areas of Latin 
America that were colonised by the Spanish, who relied on doctrines of 
conquest for territory acquisition, endured policies of ‘wardship and assimila-
tion’,55 and ultimately have ‘focused on the need for cultural, if not physical or 
territorial, distinction’.56 Thus, we can see that the ways in which Indigenous 
communities have delineated justice, and implemented strategies to achieve it, 
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have been affected by the justificatory tools invoked by colonising powers. 
Justice is a product of historical injustice. Contemporary activism has been 
influenced by the ways in which Indigenous groups were historically treated, 
and the ways in which their domestic dispossessions were justified by 
international law. It is now important to examine this contemporary activism, 
and how the modern international agenda constructs indigeneity. 
IV  I N D I G E N E I T Y  I N  T H E  MO D E R N  I N T E R NAT IO NA L 
International law, and its relationship to the domestic, has shifted since the 
days of colonialism, in ways that Indigenous peoples can employ in order to 
address historic and ongoing wrongs. As Anaya argues, while international 
law was once an ‘instrument of colonialism’, it has ‘developed and continues to 
develop, however grudgingly or imperfectly, to support indigenous peoples’ 
demands’.57 This movement can be seen at the particular level of the concept 
of indigeneity. Recently, the place of Indigenous peoples in the international 
sphere is expressed in starkly different terms compared to times of colonial 
expansion. The modern international agenda seeks to atone for the conse-
quences of these modes of acquisition focusing on the very thing that was 
created to justify the taking of territory — indigeneity. 
Political action by Indigenous peoples was traditionally limited within the 
state. However, transnational Indigenous activism has proliferated in recent 
decades.58 This increase in transnational activism has been facilitated by a 
move away from state-centrism in international law, towards a plurality of 
actors and a greater role for non-state actors.59 Greater investigation into the 
behaviour of states has been permitted, with sovereignty not the shield it once 
was. This has changed the norms around state behaviour vis-à-vis their 
citizens, as shown by the burgeoning of fields like international criminal law 
and the doctrine of the responsibility to protect. There has also been an 
increase in the discourse around collective rights and activism.60 These shifts 
have all had implications for the concept of indigeneity. A number of Indige-
nous communities have joined together to pursue common goals, and as a 
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sign of solidarity in their common struggles. The similarities and differences 
between these Indigenous communities have informed the concept of 
indigeneity; and as noted above, a constructivist approach to the concept 
allows both these similarities and differences to be appreciated. 
Kingsbury charts the change in the term Indigenous peoples since the 
1970s, arguing that there has been a transformation 
from a prosaic description without much significance in international law and 
politics, into a concept with considerable power as a basis for group mobiliza-
tion, international standard setting, transnational networks and programmatic 
activity of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations.61 
Indigenous peoples or indigeneity has therefore become an ‘overarching self-
conception to unify the international political movement of indigenous 
peoples’.62 This can be seen as culminating in the Declaration. While the 
Declaration does not define Indigenous peoples or indigeneity, it rests on the 
acknowledgement of these concepts. The Declaration recognises the meaning 
of Indigenous peoples — to, and for, Indigenous peoples — and acknowledges 
the suffering of Indigenous peoples from  
historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession 
of their lands, territories and resources … [as well as the] need to respect and 
promote the inherent rights of indigenous peoples which derive from their po-
litical, economic and social structures and from their cultures, spiritual tradi-
tions, histories and philosophies, especially their rights to their lands, territo-
ries and resources.63 
With its application to ‘Indigenous peoples and individuals’,64 the Declaration 
operates both on the collective and the individual levels. This is crucial, as the 
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Declaration legitimates and affirms the ‘value of protecting indigenous 
peoples’ ways of life and cultures per se’.65 
Through the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, an organisation 
that formed the genesis of the drafting and advancing of the Declaration, it 
became apparent that there was a 
universality to the narrative of oppression and racial discrimination described 
by Indigenous peoples as a consequence of colonisation … [and] a commonali-
ty to the ways colonisers had dispossessed Indigenous peoples of their lands.66  
Again, these commonalities could be drawn upon, and they provided a 
basis for the Declaration as a document that could tie indigeneity — the 
original justification for this oppression and dispossession — to a greater call 
for justice. 
Williams argues that formalised structures, particularly the Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations, allowed Indigenous peoples to tell their 
stories; and through this, ‘indigenous peoples have begun to transform legal 
thought and doctrine about the rights that matter to them under international 
law’.67 In particular, the Declaration can ‘translate’ these stories ‘into terms 
that settler state governments, particularly in the West, will take seriously’.68 
In working through these formal structures, engaging strategically with 
political processes and aims, and employing the language of rights, Indige-
nous peoples have been able to use international law for their own advance-
ment.69 Nonetheless, there are still further advancements to make. The 
Declaration acknowledges the right to self-determination,70 but does not go 
as far as acknowledging the wrongs of settler and colonial relations, or a right 
of secession. Indeed, the international legal system still sees the ‘cultural 
survival, territorial integrity, and self-determining autonomy of indigenous 
peoples as matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the settler state regimes 
that invaded and subjugated them’.71 Megan Davis writes that the choice 
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of internal self-determination in the Declaration is a pragmatic decision and 
a political choice.72 While this is undoubtedly true, it remains important 
to inquire into the consequences of such a reality, and to acknowledge 
the placement of the Declaration within a system that still prioritises the 
settler state regime. 
A key element of the significance of the Declaration is that it can be in-
voked to hold the behaviour of states, in relation to Indigenous peoples, to 
account against a normative standard. While it does not create any new rights 
in international law, nor any binding obligations in domestic legal systems,73 
the Declaration has several important functions at the domestic level. These 
include its moral value, its educative value, and its role as a source for the 
domestic judiciary.74 In Australia — a country which does not have a treaty 
with its Indigenous peoples, nor any recognition of them in its national 
constitution — the Declaration will be ‘the primary basis upon which indige-
nous peoples conduct their affairs with the state’.75 The Declaration also 
specifies certain obligations on the state. These include the need to provide 
effective mechanisms for the prevention of, and redress for, actions of 
dispossession of culture or land, or for any form of propaganda designed to 
promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed towards the 
Indigenous peoples.76 The Declaration thus specifies actionable rights to be 
implemented at the domestic level, and provides a normative framework for 
the behaviour of states in relation to Indigenous peoples. As Williams argues, 
the Declaration is capable of commanding  
attention and response in many domestic political and legal arenas … Its pro-
scriptions could be used in a variety of highly-publicized forums by any num-
ber of groups and individuals to challenge state action which threatens the sur-
vival of indigenous peoples.77 
 
 72 See Davis, ‘To Bind or Not To Bind’, above n 66, 47. 
 73 Davis, ‘Indigenous Struggles in Standard-Setting’, above n 10, 465. See also ibid 39; Alexandra 
Xanthaki, ‘Indigenous Rights in International Law over the Last 10 Years and Future Devel-
opments’ (2009) 10 Melbourne Journal of International Law 27. 
 74 Davis, ‘Indigenous Struggles in Standard-Setting’, above n 10, 468. 
 75 Ibid 470. 
 76 Declaration arts 8, 11(2); see also at arts 12–17. 
 77 Williams, ‘Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law’, above n 14, 683–4. 
2016] The Place of the First Peoples in the International Sphere 1001 
 
The Declaration is, therefore, a prime example of Indigenous peoples working 
at the international level, in order to advance their rights at a domestic level. 
V  CO N C LU SI O N  
We can therefore see that the place of Indigenous peoples at the intersection 
of the domestic and the international has shifted. While traditionally interna-
tional law was used by states to oppress Indigenous peoples, today interna-
tional law can be used by Indigenous peoples to hold states to account and to 
assert our or their specific demands for continued participation in the 
international, and as a consequence, the domestic. As an example, the passage 
of the Declaration has meant that Indigenous peoples have a particular 
international tool to use in order to measure state and domestic behaviour in 
relation to Indigenous peoples. 
Indigeneity was originally a term imposed upon Indigenous peoples by 
colonial powers, but in recent years Indigenous peoples have had a significant 
stake in creating and clarifying the imposed concept and its contemporary use 
and meaning. Particularly through the drafting, negotiating and passing of the 
Declaration, Indigenous peoples have moved from being the object of the 
discussion, to the subject. This fact alone demonstrates the potential for the 
concept of indigeneity to be used at the intersection of the domestic and the 
international, to achieve justice for Indigenous peoples. As Williams notes, 
through drafting the Declaration, Indigenous peoples could begin ‘to redefine 
the terms of their survival in international law’.78 And Davis reiterates the 
importance of this: ‘Indigenous peoples are in the international sphere, not 
just as a manifestation of our external self-determination, but because 
international law has mattered’.79 We see here the transformative potential, 
and the transformative uses, of international law. 
However, further advancements must be made for Indigenous peoples to 
realise justice — on our or their terms. Indigeneity demonstrates the way a 
concept can move from being a tool of oppression to a tool of potentially 
greater freedom. This suggests a necessary starting point for the place of 
Indigenous peoples in our or their activism for justice at the intersection of 
the domestic and the international. And in addition, the international order 
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bears a duty to the ongoing development of Indigenous peoples. Having 
created the concept of indigeneity, the international is responsible to it. 
Acknowledging where the concept of indigeneity emerged from — and the 
reasons for its creation by the international — brings the Indigenous claims to 
justice closer. With the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples in 2014, and 
its outcome document,80 the place of Indigenous peoples in the international 
is continuing to gain momentum. 
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